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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting defendant Hogan's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and no 
deference is accorded to the district court's legal conclusions. Brigham Young University 
v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., a.k.a. Tremco Legal Solutions, 2005 UT 19 ^ }13, 522 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18, quoting Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^ |14, 56 P.3d 524. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Aionos' motion to amend their 
complaint. 
Standard of Review: The denial for a motion to amend is viewed for abuse 
of discretion. Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const, Inc., 2004 UT App. 354, [^29, 101 P.3d 
371. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by denying Aionos' alternative motion for 
additional time. 
Standard of Review: The appellate court presumes the correctness of the 
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court's decision absent manifest injustice or a clear abuse of discretion. Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987). 
4. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Aionos' complaint which 
included the unserved party State Farm. 
Standard of Review: Summary Judgment is reviewed for correctness with 
no deference given to the trial court. Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, 
Inc., a.k.a. Tremco Legal Solutions, 2005 UT 19 ^ |13, 522 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (quoting 
Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, %\A, 56 P.3d 524. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are determinative of this action. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 is implicated, which provides: 
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading 
is one to which no responsive pleadings is permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 
20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only 
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to 
an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, 
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
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(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
FACTS 
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident which was alleged to have 
occurred on July 18, 1996. (R.2, plaintiffs' complaint f 7). Plaintiffs Voi Aiono and 
Cheryl Aiono brought their action against Kendall Hogan and State Farm Insurance. (R.l 
plaintiffs' complaint). 
Plaintiffs' complaint claims that Kendall Hogan was operating a motor vehicle in a 
negligent fashion at the time and place of the accident and that Voi Aiono and Cheryl 
Aiono suffered injuries as a result of that accident. The Aionos sued State Farm under the 
theory that they were not treated fairly where State Farm by coincidence was their insurer. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed March 10, 2003, almost seven years after the 
accident. No party was served within 120 days as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Instead, on July 8, 2003, an ex parte motion for the extension of time 
was filed, which motion was granted on July 9, 2003. (R.l 1). A return of service on 
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defendant Kendall Hogan was filed with the trial court September 5, 2003, with an 
attached affidavit of service by a deputy constable. (R.14-15). 
Kendall Hogan answered the complaint, which answer was filed November 10, 
2003. In its responsive pleading, defendant Hogan pled: "Further pleading, defendant 
maintains that plaintiffs' complaint against State Farm is an impermissible direct action. 
Moreover, it unnecessarily injects the issue of insurance into this lawsuit as it pertains to 
Mr. Hogan." (R.19). Further, defendant put plaintiffs on notice that it believed an 
insufficient investigation had been undertaken so as to bring the claim against Mr. Hogan 
and defendant reserved the right to bring a motion for Rule 11 sanctions to address the 
issue. (R.20). 
A stipulated discovery plan was filed by the parties January 30, 2004. (R.22). No 
activity whatsoever occurred between the filing of the discovery plan and defendant 
Hogan's motion for summary judgment. Particularly, plaintiffs undertook no discovery. 
State Farm was never served and never appeared as a party to this matter. 
Plaintiffs' sole allegation in the complaint against State Farm is as follows: 
17. Plaintiffs, at the time of the accident, were insured by State Farm 
insurance, as was defendant. State Farm insurance has failed and refused to 
honor its promise, contract, and covenant with plaintiffs in that they have 
not timely, responsibly, and in good faith attempted to settle this claim. It 
has also failed to negotiate and bargain in good faith. 
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18. State Farm Insurance has failed and refused to responsibly respond 
to the demands of plaintiffs, specifically those related to medical costs and 
injuries, thereby forcing plaintiffs to file this suit. 
(R.41fl7andl8). 
The motion for summary judgment brought by defendant Hogan was supported by 
five statements of fact. Statement number five in the motion asserted that defendant 
Kendall Hogan was not the driver of the automobile involved in the motor vehicle 
accident. (R.29 ^|5). The motion also set forth that Teresa R. Peterson, who appears to be 
the driver in the police report connected with the accident (R.36), did not have Kendall 
Hogan's permission to drive his vehicle. (R.29 [^4). Kendall Hogan acknowledged that 
he was the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. (R.29 ^2). Defendant Hogan's 
motion was short and simple. Hogan's argument was twofold: (1) that he was not the 
driver of the vehicle and that the cause of action must be directed against the actual tort 
feasor; and, (2) that he had not given permission to drive the vehicle to Teresa Peterson. 
Based upon these assertions, Hogan asked the court to dismiss the complaint. The motion 
was filed April 5, 2004. (R.26). 
In response to the motion, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend or in the alternative a 
motion for additional time. (R.44). Pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-
501, the statements of fact in defendant's motion were deemed admitted because 
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plaintiffs did not refute any of those facts in their responsive pleading.1 Plaintiffs' motion 
to amend asked the trial court to allow plaintiffs to amend their pleading to name Teresa 
R. Peterson as a party defendant and acknowledged "it appears that the wrong party was 
named by prior counsel at the time the complaint was filed." (R.44). Plaintiffs further 
pled that in the event the motion to amend was denied by the court, counsel should be 
allowed to conduct discovery prior to responding to the motion for summary judgment. 
(R.44). The request for discovery prior to responding to the motion for summary 
judgment did not include an affidavit of counsel pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(f). Plaintiffs' motion to amend was opposed by defendant Hogan. (R.49). The matter 
was submitted to the trial court on June 1, 2004. (R.66). 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
In the court's notice regarding the motion for summary judgment the court advised 
the parties that certain matters outside of the pleadings would be addressed. Specifically, 
the notice contained a notation: "Also please be prepared to address the court's question 
concerning jurisdiction." (R.68). It appears from a note in the file that the court had 
identified the issue of jurisdiction as one regarding the statute of limitations. Particularly, 
^ h e sum and substance of Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501 now finds 
its substance in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7. 
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the court notation notes that the accident occurred July 18, 1996 and the complaint was 
filed March 3, 2003. (R.65a2). 
THE HEARING 
Hogan's motion was heard July 12, 2004. See Transcript of Hearing ( R.84), 
attached hereto as Addendum A.3 The first issue addressed by the court was whether the 
statute of limitations had run.4 It was related to the court that a previous case had been 
filed against Mr. Hogan, case number 000206066, which was dismissed for failure to 
prosecute on March 12, 2002. That case was filed July 14, 2000, four days before the 
statute of limitations would have run. Argument transcript pg 4, In 8. Plaintiffs' counsel 
indicated that as far as the statute of limitations would apply, plaintiffs would be relying 
on the savings statute. (Hearing transcript pg. 6, In. 2). 
At that point, the trial court moved on to other issues. First, the issue was 
addressed that the insurance company is not a proper party to this case. (Transcript page 
2
 The trial court mispaginated the appellate record and this note is not numbered in 
the record. 
3The entire hearing transcript is given the single designation of (R.84). Therefore, 
all references will be made to the page number of the transcript. 
4The statute of limitations was an affirmative defense preserved by the defendant 
in its answer. (R.19). 
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6, In 16). After arguing the issue whether an amendment would relate back, the court 
discussed the fact that an action must be brought against the actual tort feasor and not an 
insurance company. Whereupon the court indicated to plaintiffs' counsel: "I want 
everything discussed so that when a ruling comes down nobody claims I didn't hear it all 
and it is important that I can hear it all and you can respond after, of course." (Transcript 
pg 17, In 20-23). Plaintiffs' counsel addressed whether there would be a unity of interest 
between Teresa Peterson and State Farm. (Transcript pg. 18). The court specifically 
addressed whether a unity of interest could be found between Ms. Peterson and State 
Farm whereupon the court concluded: 
And the question of whether we can stretch that enough, that there is a unity 
of interest between State Farm and Ms. Peterson, and that there really isn't 
any prejudice because State Farm was somehow put on notice that this suit 
was being pursued, and therefore, it would go to Ms. Peterson, I think is 
just pushing it too far past the point of where there really is a prejudice. 
The court concluded there was an insufficient unity of interest between any of the 
defendants and Teresa Peterson so as apply the relation back rule. (Transcript pg 19). 
The court concluded: 
Clearly, the wrong parties in the suit have been named. The suit named the 
wrong parties here. I have made the ruling that Mr. Hogan is not the tort 
feasor, he is dismissed out of the case and I do not find that it is saved and 
allow for the amended information to include Ms. Peterson. 
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(Transcript pg 21). 
The order granting summary judgment bears a mailing certificate indicating that it 
was mailed to plaintiffs' counsel July 13, 2004. See Order attached hereto as Addendum 
B. No objection to the order was made. The order was entered August 3, 2004 granting 
summary judgment and dismissing the entire complaint. (R.71). Plaintiffs' notice of 
appeal followed filed September 1, 2004. (R.74). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Kendall Hogan had no liability under the record before the trial court. 
Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately granted. At no time did plaintiffs file 
any pleading in opposition to the motion, nor did plaintiffs argue against the motion on its 
merits. Indeed, plaintiffs' sole response to the motion for summary judgment was a 
motion to amend with an alternative request for additional discovery unsupported, as 
required, by a Rule 56(f) affidavit. 
The only allegation of plaintiffs' complaint was that Mr. Hogan was negligent in 
his operation of a motor vehicle. Mr. Hogan's affidavit, which was wholly unopposed, is 
completely dispositive. Mr. Hogan's affidavit conclusively indicates he was not driving 
the vehicle. With no other theory of liability having been proffered by plaintiffs' 
complaint, or sought to be part of the amendment, the trial court could only reach one 
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conclusion, that of dismissal and entry of summary judgment. This conclusion must be 
affirmed. 
The entire case was properly dismissed. The trial court made a conclusion that the 
improper parties had been named in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs have asserted that because 
State Farm is their insurance carrier, it owed them a duty of good faith, since State Farm 
also insured the tort feasor vehicle. This exact theory has been rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Sperry v. Sperry, 1999 UT 101, 990 P.2d 381. 
Plaintiffs' great reliance on the recent decision of Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 
98 P.3d 28 is misplaced. The Speros decision has no relevance whatsoever to the present 
matter. Speros discusses neither amendments to pleadings nor tort liability. Instead, 
Speros solely addresses the issue of insurance coverage under mandatory insurance 
requirements of the motor vehicle insurance code liability section. No coverage issues 
are presented in this case, and therefore the Speros decision is simply irrelevant. 
Plaintiffs' motion for additional time was properly denied. The Rules of Civil 
Procedure as well as the case law of the Utah Appellate Courts is clear that in the absence 
of the affidavit filed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), additional time for 
discovery should not be granted. Plaintiffs themselves in their brief even cite Rule 56(f) 
without recognizing that the rule itself is fatal to their argument. There was no affidavit 
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filed. Nor was there anything in the pleadings which states what discovery plaintiffs 
wanted to be undertaken. 
The trial court properly denied the motion to amend. Defendant argued that the 
amendment should not be allowed because the amendment had nothing to do with 
Kendall Hogan, the amendment should not be allowed because there is no unity of 
interest and the amendment would be a futility. The trial court correctly held that there 
was no unity of interest between the defendants and Teresa Peterson. 
The trial court was compelled to reach this conclusion based upon Penrose v. Ross, 
2003 UT App. 157, 71 P.3d 631. Plaintiffs' complete lack of citation of the Penrose 
decision is curious given the fact that plaintiffs themselves attached a copy of the case to 
the reply memorandum on the issue of amendment before the trial court. (R.59). 
In Penrose, the allegations of the complaint were that a father operated his vehicle 
negligently causing damage to the plaintiff. 2003 UT App. 157 at f2. After the statute of 
limitation had run, the plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint to name the driver of 
the vehicle, a newly named defendant, the father's son. Id. at %3 Both father and son 
subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on separate grounds. Id. at ^j 4, 5. 
The basis for the father's motion was that he was not the driver of the vehicle and the 
evidence supporting the motion was submitted through the father's affidavit, just as Mr. 
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Hogan did in this case. Id at [^4. This court in Penrose held that the father and son did 
not have the same legal interest and therefore an amendment naming the son would not 
relate back to the original filing of the complaint. Id. at TJ19. 
The same result should obtain here. Since there is no identity of interest, the 
amendment would clearly fail as violative of the statute of limitations. As such, the court 
was well within its discretion to simply deny to motion to amend. Since there was no 
identity of interest, amending the complaint would have no effect on this lawsuit, and 
more importantly, the pending motion for summary judgment. In an attempt to bring the 
facts to the present case close to the facts of case law from other jurisdictions, plaintiffs 
rely on facts not found in the record but rather on facts that are simply fiction. Most 
astonishingly, plaintiffs claim State Farm received notice of the filing of the suit prior to 
expiration of the statute of limitations by service upon Mr. Hogan. As is clear in the 
record, the opposite is true. Mr. Hogan was not served until seven years after the 
accident, and therefore more than three years after the statute of limitations had expired. 
Because the motion for summary judgment was basically unopposed, this court 
should sustain the entry of summary judgment as it pertains to Mr. Hogan. Further, 
because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend and all 
remaining claims were obviously without basis, the court's refusal to amend and dismiss 
12 
the remainder of the suit must be sustained. 
ARGUMENT 
Although the standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is for 
correctness, because the manner in which plaintiffs responded to defendant's motion, the 
only standards applicable are abuse of discretion as it relates to the motion to amend and 
clear abuse of discretion as it relates to the denial of the request for additional discovery. 
Before the trial court, no substantive opposition was made to defendant's motion. 
Plaintiffs' brief fails to show an abuse of discretion. As to the summary judgment issue, 
the trial court reached the only conclusion it could. Accordingly, the trial court must be 
affirmed. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED 
A granting of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Brigham Young 
University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., a.k.a. Tremco Legal Solutions, 2005 UT 19, 522 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 This court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any grounds, 
even those not relied upon by the trial court. Straub v. Fisher, 1999 Utah 102, ^ f6, 990 
P.2d384. 
Summary judgment was appropriately granted in this case as the motion itself was 
in no way opposed by the plaintiffs. At no time did plaintiffs file any pleading in 
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opposition to the motion, nor did plaintiffs argue against the motion on the merits. 
Indeed, plaintiffs' sole response to the motion for summary judgment was a motion to 
amend with an alternative request for additional discovery. Plaintiffs admit that Kendall 
Hogan was not the driver of the vehicle. Further, they admit that no basis exists upon 
which to claim a negligent entrustment theory. The motion, having been essentially 
unopposed as to Mr. Hogan, was properly granted. 
Plaintiffs' complaint only alleged that Mr. Hogan was negligent as a result of his 
operation of a motor vehicle. (R.2 Tf 7 and 8). There exists no allegation in the complaint 
of negligent entrustment. Nevertheless, in the event that such an issue came to the court's 
mind, the affidavit of Kendall Hogan rebutted this assertion as well. Thus, Mr. Hogan's 
affidavit, which was wholly unopposed, is completely dispositive. His affidavit provides 
(1) that Hogan was not driving and (2) that he did not entrust the vehicle to the person 
who apparently was the driver. With no other theory of liability having been proffered by 
plaintiffs' complaint, or sought to be part of the amendment, the trial court could only 
reach one conclusion, that of dismissal and entry of summary judgment. This conclusion 
must be affirmed. 
The entire case was properly dismissed. The trial court correctly dismissed the 
entire case as State Farm was an improper party. State Farm was never served in the 
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lawsuit. It is important for this court to note the actual cause of action brought against 
State Farm. Plaintiffs did not bring a cause of action against State Farm as the insurer of 
the vehicle involved in the accident. Instead, plaintiffs asserted that because State Farm 
was their insurance carrier, it owed them a duty of good faith. This exact theory has been 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Sperry v. Sperry, 1999 UT 101, 990 P.2d 381, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a named insured bringing a personal injury action as a plaintiff occupied the position of a 
third party, rather than a first party, with respect to an insurer and thus could not sue the 
insurer for bad faith, or for anything else concerning claim handling. In Sperry, Mrs. 
Sperry was suing Mr. Sperry for negligence and not upon her own coverage under her 
policy. Id. at f^lO. The Sperry court recognized that the insurer had a contractual duty to 
defend Mr. Sperry. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of 
Mrs. Sperry's complaint against the carrier. Id. at ^|11. 
While the trial court here may not have so clearly articulated the reasons that 
plaintiffs could not maintain their action against State Farm, the issue was nonetheless 
discussed in the hearing of this matter. In the court's parlance, the plaintiffs had sued the 
wrong parties. Accordingly, it was correct for the trial court to dismiss the entire action 
as there was no basis of liability as a matter of law to any of the named defendants under 
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the theory pled in plaintiffs' complaint. 
The plaintiffs place great reliance on the recently handed down decision of Speros 
v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28. The Speros decision is cited in nine different places 
in plaintiffs' brief and plaintiffs argue that the Speros decision is dispositive. However, 
the Speros decision has no relevance whatsoever to the present matter. Plaintiffs' 
reliance can only be described as curious, and the development of the theory in plaintiffs' 
brief can best be explained as misguided. Speros discusses neither amendments of 
pleadings nor tort liability. Instead, Speros solely addresses the issue of insurance 
coverage under mandatory insurance requirements of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Code's 
liability sections and the relevant policy. Plaintiffs' complaint in the present matter raises 
no issues regarding coverage. Kendall Hogan's affidavit and the motion for summary 
judgment do not address coverage either. The Speros decision is simply irrelevant. 
State Farm was not a movant in this case because State Farm had never been 
served. Nevertheless, trial courts possess the inherent ability to rule on obvious matters 
sua sponte. In Panos v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 913 P.2d 363 (Utah App. 
1996), this court recognized that although Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states that a 
defendant must bring a motion to dismiss, "We have ruled that a court may dismiss a 
claim sua sponte without a motion by the defendant." Id. at 364. Just as Rule 41(b) was 
16 
read as merely permitting a motion, but not requiring a motion by a defendant, similarly, 
Rule 56(a) and (b) merely permit parties to brings motions, but clearly do not diminish a 
trial court's inherent ability to rule on obvious issues. 
Further, Rule 56(d) admonishes the trial court that if a motion under Rule 56 does 
not render the whole case final that the trial court "at the hearing on the motion" may 
examine the pleadings and interrogate counsel to see what issues remained. Certainly, the 
fact that the court holds a hearing and examines the pleadings and puts issues towards 
counsel indicates that should the court find only meritless claims remain, those claims 
may be summarily dismissed. Otherwise, the true purposes of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure would be obliterated. All of the rules of Civil Procedure "[s]hall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 1(a). The position advocated by the Aionos in this matter is 
the opposite. The plaintiffs would have the court, when confronted with a clearly 
meritless claim stated against an unserved party, allow the claim to stand as an obstacle to 
complete resolution. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that a trial court may properly raise sua sponte 
issues of mootness. Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 100 P.3d 1151 f^ 36, citing Society of 
ProfessionalJournalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987). The Shipman 
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court noted: "By doing so, the court acts in furtherance of a core judicial policy to limit 
the scope of its power to issues in controversy." Likewise, when a court is confronted 
with facially meritless claims, it remains within the inherent powers of that court to 
dismiss the entire action. In Shiprnan, unlike the present case, when a court sua sponte 
dismissed an issue, the plaintiff asked for review of the issue. Id. at f^ 20. In the present 
case, plaintiffs asked for no such review. As previously stated, the order on summary 
judgment dismissing the entire action was entered without objection from plaintiffs. The 
determination of the trial court is correct as a matter of law. Even if it was not, by failure 
to object to the order, plaintiffs have waived the issue. 
This case is similar to an argument made in Pett v. Fleet Mortgage Corporation, 
2004 UT App. 150, 91 P.3d 854, where a party claimed that a court improperly converted 
a Rule 12(d)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. In 
finding a lack of err, this court stated: 
Second, a summary judgment in this case would ultimately have been 
appropriate for the same reason that a Rule 12 dismissal was appropriate: 
regardless of what facts were or were not alleged, Ted's claim that 
Washington Mutual was required to reconvey the property to her simply 
fails as a matter of law. Thus, even were we to hold that the trial court's 
Rule 12 dismissal should be converted to Rule 56 summary judgment 
ruling, we would still affirm the dismissal. 
Id at^fl4, footnote 3. 
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Obviously, the Pett decision recognizes the principle that where trial courts are 
faced with meritless claims, they may be dealt with. More importantly, when a case is on 
appeal, if the appellate court can clearly see that the result would be the same regardless 
of the procedural setting, the determination of the trial court should be affirmed. 
In the present case, under the Sperry analysis, there is no question but that the 
claim asserted by the plaintiffs is not recognized under Utah law.5 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
In response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs only argued 
that they should be able to amend their complaint or have additional time to conduct 
discovery. The court properly denied the request for additional time. 
When a motion for summary judgment has been filed, the nonmoving party may 
present, in the form of affidavit, reasons why he cannot present facts essential to justify 
his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 
If such facts are presented, the court can order a continuance and allow the parties to 
5In addition to Sperry recognizing the plaintiffs claim was improper, Utah law 
also holds that direct actions against insurers of tort feasors are not allowed. County v. 
Jensen, 2003 UT App. 444, \\ 1, 83 P.3d 405. Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that automobile insurers cannot be joined as real parties in interest in tort actions. 
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638. 
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conduct further discovery before entertaining the motion. Id. 
A request to conduct further discovery must be submitted in the form of an 
affidavit. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah App. 1987). The 
non-moving party must show through affidavit testimony that any additional time to 
conduct discovery would enable him to rebut the allegations of the movant's motion for 
summary judgment. Culver v. Town ofTorrington, 930 F.2d 1456, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 
1991). Additionally, the affidavit requesting the additional time to conduct discovery 
must show why the nonmovant is unable to proffer evidence in opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 
880, 893 (Utah 1993). The additional discovery to be conducted by the nonmoving party 
must address the legal issues presented in the summary judgment proceedings. Holmes v. 
American States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App. 85, ^ 27, 1 P.3d 552 (Utah App. 2000). 
Plaintiffs' argument regarding additional time makes no sense. First, plaintiffs cite 
Rule 56(f) without even recognizing that the rule provides that reasons must be stated "by 
affidavit" in order to support a request for additional time. There is no affidavit. Nor is 
there anything in the pleadings which states what discovery plaintiffs want to be 
undertaken. The entire argument regarding further time is found once in the motion itself 
and once in the memorandum. The motion states: "In the event that this motion is denied 
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by this court, counsel requests time to conduct discovery prior to responding to defendant 
Hogan's motion for summary judgment." (R.44). The memorandum as to discovery only 
states: "In the event this court denies plaintiffs' motion, plaintiffs request that they be 
given leave to conduct discovery on the issue of potential liability of defendant Hogan." 
No particular activities are outlined. No statement is made why in the months following 
the filing of the complaint plaintiffs did not attempt to undertake any discovery 
whatsoever. Instead, now on appeal, plaintiffs reach back to a 1997 decision which does 
not even address the need to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit. In the absence of this affidavit, 
and because under Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501 no statement of opposition 
was made to the fact, any further discovery could not dispute the facts anyway. 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs only made a naked request for additional time. The 
sum and substance of plaintiffs' pleadings are an acknowledgment that plaintiffs sued the 
wrong parties and was simply asking the court to piggyback on wrongfully filed 
pleadings. The denial of the request for additional time was not a clear abuse of 
discretion. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO AMEND 
Defendant Hogan argued that the amendment should not be allowed because (1) 
the amendment had nothing to do with Kendall Hogan, (2) the amendment would be 
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wrong since there was no unity of interest, and (3) since the amendment would be a 
futility it should not occur in this lawsuit. The trial court correctly held that there was no 
unity of interest between the defendants and Teresa Peterson. 
The trial court was compelled to reach a conclusion based upon the case of 
Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App. 157, 71 P.3d 631. Plaintiffs' complete lack of citation of 
the Penrose decision is curious given the fact that plaintiffs themselves attached a copy of 
the decision to their reply memorandum on the issue of the amendment before the trial 
court. (R.59). This court addressed similar issues to this case in Penrose. In Penrose, 
the plaintiff filed a complaint in negligence originally naming the father of a tort feasor as 
the defendant. Id. at ^|2. The allegations of the Penrose complaint were that the father 
operated his vehicle negligently thereby causing damage to the plaintiff. After the statute 
of limitations had run, the plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint to name the driver 
of the vehicle, a newly named defendant, the father's son. Id. at ^[3. Both father and son 
subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on separate grounds. The basis for the 
father's motion was that he was not the driver of the vehicle and the evidence supporting 
the motion was submitted through the father's affidavit. Id. at |^4 The trial court granted 
the father's motion for summary judgment and denied the amendment. 
In affirming the award of summary judgment in favor of the father, the court of 
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appeals relied upon Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) and its 
progeny which hold that an amendment substituting or adding a new < iriy does not relate 
back to the original filing of the complaint. Id. at 634. This court held that unless two 
parties have the same legal interest, there is not an identity of interest sufficient to allow 
substii * of a new party to amend back the original filing of the complain! This court 
held that the father and son did not have the same legal interest and therefore any 
amendment naming the son would not relate back to the original filing of the complaint. 
Just as in the Penrose case, there is no identity of interest between Kendall Hogan 
proposed substitute defendant, feresa R. Peterson. The interests in the present 
matter are even further apart than one can find in Penrose. Indeed, the plaintiffs in the 
present matter have failed to establish any identity of interest between Kendall Hogan and 
Teresa Peterson. Since there is no identity of interest, the amendment learly fail 
as violative of the statute of limitations. As such, the court was well within its discretion 
to simply deny the motion to amend. Since there was no identity of interest, amending the 
complaint would have no effect on this lawsuit and more importantly the pending motion 
lo r s u m m a r y judgment. 
Absent from the plaintiffs' memoranda before the trial court, and absent in 
plaintiffs' brief, is any indication that a relation back would also relate back to the prior 
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filing in the year 2000. Even if the amendment had been allowed by the trial court, the 
amendment would only relate back to the filing of 2003. There is nothing in the savings 
statute or any other case law in Utah which would hold that a motion to amend eight years 
after an accident would relate back to a previously filed complaint filed years before. 
It is pure sophistry to argue that the lawsuit filed in 2000 gave notice to anyone. 
As the attachment to plaintiffs' brief in Addendum 1 highlights, that case was dismissed 
for lack of prosecution, no party having been served with that lawsuit. The first time that 
Kendall Hogan or any defendant was aware of any lawsuit was when Hogan was served 
in the latter part of 2003, seven years after the accident. 
Accordingly, as there was no good reason to allow the amendment in this case, 
particularly where the statute of limitations would have already run against Teresa 
Peterson. Therefore, the court was well within its discretion to disallow the amendment. 
In addressing Rule 15, Utah court's recognize the doctrine of futility. 
Although leave to amend is "freely given when justice so requires," Utah 
Rule of Civil procedure 15(a), justice does not require that leave be given 
"if doing so would be futile." 
Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51, \ 139, 82 P.3d 1076, citing Benton v. Adams, 
56 P.3d 81, 87 (Colo. 2002). (Citing 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 15-15[3] (3rd Ed. 1997). In making this statement, the Jensen court also cited Andalex 
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Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) which held that leave to 
amend should not be given if a newly asserted claim is legally insufficient or futile. 
In the present case, any claim against Teresa Peterson would be futile. The 
complaint in this action was filed in 2003. Although a previous complaint had been filed, 
it had >een served on anyone, and accordingly, no i 'ice could possibly be argued by 
the filing of this pleading. Instead, seven years after the accident, and three years after 
the statute had run, plaintiffs sought to bring a new party into the action. Since the trial 
coiirt coiild find \mder the Penrose precedent that there was no identity of interest, the 
denial of the motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion. 
In an attempt to prevail on this appeal, plaintiffs have resorted to pure fiction or at 
least matters which are not in the record. In addition to claiming that State Farm was 
aware of the pending suit, although it had not been served,6 the record before this c< 
does not exhibit notice to any defendant within the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiffs also claim: 
[State Farm] also had correspondence with Aionos' attorney. State Farm 
had the right to investigate the claim, the right and duty to defend the suit, 
and the right to settle any claim or suit, which it did not. State Farm was 
6It is conceded that State Farm was aware of Kendall Hogan's being served and 
was probably aware that they had been named in a lawsuit. However, such notice only 
came when Kendall Hogan was served on August 3, 2003, seven years after the accident. 
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heavily involved in the defense of this suit. At the least, State Farm 
received notice of the filing of the suit prior to the expiration of the statute 
of limitations when Kendall was served with (sic) summons and complaint. 
Appellant's brief at 25. 
Not only are these facts not found in the record, they are in fact a 
misrepresentation of the record. There is no evidence in the record of any 
correspondence between State Farm and the Aionos' attorneys. There is no 
correspondence or other evidence in the record showing any ongoing relationship 
between the plaintiffs or their counsel and State Farm as an insurer. There is no evidence 
that State Farm has been "heavily involved" in the defense of this suit. Most 
astonishingly, plaintiffs claim State Farm received notice of the filing of the suit prior to 
the expiration of the statute of limitations by service upon Mr. Hogan. As is clear in the 
record, the opposite is true. 
None of plaintiffs' arguments are supported by the cases cited. The cases cited in 
support of plaintiffs' argument regarding the relation back of amendments only further 
bolster defendant's position. A review of these cases and their factual underpinnings and 
holdings shows the futility of plaintiffs' argument. 
Unlike the situation in Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 
UT App. 354, 101 P.3d 371, where a party to be brought in by an amended pleading was 
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informallv involved, Teresa Peterson is in no way involved in this action. There is no 
evidence that Teresa Peterson resided in the same household as Mr. Hogan. There is no 
evidence that Teresa Peterson at any time, even up to the present, has received any notice 
of these proceedings, nor is there evidence of a shared interest between Teresa Peterson 
and Kendall Hogan. As the mailing certificates show, plaintiffs did not even serve Teresa 
Peterson with their motion to amend and bring her into the lawsuit. Thus, there is no 
evidence that Teresa Peterson has ever been apprised of the pendency of this litigation. 
Plaintiffs attempt to also rely on Herbertson v. Bank 1, Utah N.A., 1999 U1 App. 
342, 995 P.2d 7 where this court held that a bank had sufficient notice to bring a new 
complaint within the savings statute as a matter of law. The most determinative factor in 
Herbertson was that the new party had actual notice. Id. at |^19, footnote 9. This is, of 
course, the opposite situation as the present matter. As stated above, there is no evidence 
of Teresa Peterson ever having notice of this matter. The court in Herbertson also found 
it significant that the new party was represented by the same attorney as the previous 
defendant. Id at ^3, footnote 1. Again, plaintiffs rely on fiction and matters completely 
outside the record to argue that the parties in the present matter have the same attorney. 
Plaintiffs argue in this case: "Teresa was insured by State Farm as well Kendall and had 
the same attorney as Kendall and State Farm, i.e., as a result of the Speros opinion." 
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Appellants' Brief at 18. 
The Defendant remains at a loss after numerous readings of the Speros opinion to 
find that the Speros opinion has any bearing on the representation of parties by attorneys. 
Nevertheless, with emphasis (both italicized and in bold) plaintiffs argue on page 19 of 
their brief that the parties share counsel. Such an assertion is not supported by the record, 
and more importantly, does not represent reality. The only party represented by Mr. 
Hogan's counsel is Mr. Hogan. 
Plaintiffs walk on shaky ground where they rely on cases allowing amendments in 
part on the basis that parties had actual notice of the original pleadings prior to the statute 
of limitations running and they shared the same attorney. These facts are simply not 
present in this matter and highlight the weakness of plaintiffs' position. The notice to any 
parties in this matter only came years after the statute of limitations had run. 
Plaintiffs' citation to Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 724 F.2d 1397 
(9th Cir. 1984) is likewise unavailing. First, Korn is a misnomer case, and plaintiff has 
admitted on the record that this is not a misnomer case. Transcript of hearing pg. 10, In. 
23 thru pg. 11, In. 3. Further, the Korn decision relied on ongoing negotiations prior to 
the statute of limitations expiring between the insurer for Royal Caribbean and the 
plaintiff. First, such an exception is not recognized in Utah law. Second, and even more 
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dispositively, such facts are not present in this case. The Korn decisions specifically 
relied upon the fact that the correct defendant receive sufficient notice within the 
limitation period. The opposite is true here. 
Plaintiffs further highlight distinctions showing even more weakness in their 
position. I laintiffs argue that there is no prejudice in an amendment in the present case 
under the reasoning of Hamilton v. Blackman, 915 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1996) highlighting 
that in Hamilton the court allowed a relation back of a filing in part because the insurance 
carrier was the "only entity with exposure for damages liability as a result of [plaintiff s] 
action." 915 P.2d at 1218, fn. 12, cited in Appellant's Brief at 23. This is not the case in 
the present suit. First, there is no evidence in the record that the insurance carrier here is 
the only entity with exposure. Second, and more importantly, plaintiffs' complaint states 
damages for a sum which is not certain. (R.4). Both as to special damages and general 
damages plaintiffs' request for damages has no ceiling. Thus, it is unreasonable to argue 
that the insurance carrier is the only entity with exposure. If the amendment were allowed 
as to Teresa Peterson, the complaint as pled clearly goes to her assets as well. 
The Red Arrows Stables, Ltd. v. Velasquez7 case also shows the unfairness inherent 
in plaintiffs request. In Red Stables, the insurance carrier asked that all information 
7725 N.E. 2d 110 (Ind. App. 2000) 
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should come through them and thus the court held that notice to the carrier constituted 
notice to the insured.. Nothing of the sort happened in the present case. Further, the Red 
Stables case showed that within days of filing the complaint and days before the original 
statute of limitations ran, plaintiffs' counsel sent the suit directly to the insurance carrier. 
725 N.E.2d at 112. No such evidence exists here. Further, in Red Arrows the motion to 
amend to add the correct party occurred two months after the original statute ran and the 
correct party had notice only two months after the original statute ran. In the present case, 
no notice was given for more than seven years after the car accident, and three years after 
the statute of limitations had run. 
Collectively, the case law cited by the plaintiffs only highlights the inequity of 
allowing the amendment as the plaintiffs have sought.8 The cases cited by plaintiffs focus 
on actual notice being given to the parties before the original statute ran, or that the 
parties had the same attorneys, or that there was no exposure except for insurance 
proceeds. None of these facts exist here. Accordingly, the case law cited by the plaintiffs 
is inapposite and unhelpful. 
8Plaintiffs even cite cases with entirely different rules than Utah's rules. Both 
Hamilton and Red Arrows construe versions of Rule 15 which, unlike Utah's rule, allow 
for the relation back based upon actual notice. Hamilton, 915 P.2d at 1216, fn. 10; Red 
Arrows, 725 N.E.2d at 113. This is true of the majority of the cases cited from 
jurisdictions other than Utah. 
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ad, plaintiffs have failed to show an abuse of discretion. The trial c 01irt 
correctly followed Utah precedent requiring an identity of interest. Accordingly, the trial 
court's denial of the motion to amend must be affirmed. 
CON< J US ION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's entry of summary judgment in this 
matter and the denial of the motion to amend should be affirmed. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 13th day of May, 2005. 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
JARED R. CASPER 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Appellee Hogan 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record in the 
matter of Aiona versus Kendall Hogan and the State Farm 
Insurance as well. For the record, for appearances we 
have, Mr. Cundick, David Cundick for the plaintiff and--
ASPER: Jared Casper. 
THE COURT: Casper? 
CASPER: Casper. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Casper for the 
defendant in this case. 
All right. I wanted to just put a few things 
on the record so that we can narrow down what at least I 
have a concern today as we address the issue. The 
original complaint that I have in this case was filed 
David Drake was the attorney when it was filed 
the 
the 
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file date that I have in 
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I do. The plaintiff 
: '" i i: i g : :i i l g 
originally 
Page 4 
filed the complaint. The Case number is 000206066. 
THE COURT: And what happened in that case? 
MR. CASPER: That cause of action was 
dismissed for failure to prosecute on March 12, 2002. 
THE COURT: And when was the date of the 
filing? Obviously, it was--
MR. CASPER: The date of the filing was July 
14, 2000, which would be four days--
THE COURT: Four days? All right. 
MR. CASPER: Within the statute of 
limitations. 
THE COURT: All right. I thought: Why are we 
going to deal with the address of whether-- the issue of 
whether it relates back if it relates back to one. 
Well, that raises an entirely different issue that 
hasn't been addressed. Is that new to you, Mr. Cundick? 
MR. CUNDICK: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That this original file, filing 
had been done? 
MR. CUNDICK: Yes, Your Honor. We might 
want to go off the record to protect Mr. Drake. 
MR. CASPER: I certainly would concur. 
THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. I just 
want to address where we are on that. 
MR. CUNDICK: He dropped the file off three 
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1 I days before he said that the expiration of service of 
2 summons was to be accomplished. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. CUNDICK: I grabbed it, got the service 
5 accomplished, never got a complete file, and essentially 
6 everything that lad was from Mr. Mortensen's office, 
Casper's office. They have been very accommodating. 
: n : • : • I 1 : : • • apologize > the Court for something that, 
of course, I wasn't aware of. If that's an issue that 
10 I needs to be addressed before we take on this. 
31 THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that 
12 whether or not it is an issue. The issue as I see it now 
I that's before me is whether or not the amended complaint 
14 would-- the whole purpose of an amended complaint then 
doesn't fall outside of the statute 
16 of limitations. 
17 MR. CUNDICK: Correct. 
! Q THE COURT: And that issue if the original 
19 complaint was within the statute of limitations, then 
goes f • !'' [r.) and the relating back issue and the 
21 relating back cases. Arid I am ready to address those 
22 i 1 .1 ] * • : i ] : I .1 I f I '• i, s t i l l n o t certai ,„ ; \; *: • • i '" 1 i n : • •< I I : : 
23 resolve the underlying issue of even if the original 
omplai^ filed if it 4L 
25 I is there not an issue? But--
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MR. CUNDICK: Then we would be arguing the 
savings statute. 
THE COURT: Oh. All right. But that's not--
MR. CASPER: Your Honor--
THE COURT: But that's not what has been 
prepared or argued up to now so I don't have that case. 
MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, in fairness to Mr. 
Casper, is it something that he wants to address? 
We're--
MR. CASPER: I guess the issue Judge, is, I 
don't represent the insurance company. 
THE COURT: You represent Mr. Hogan. 
MR. CASPER: I represent Mr. Hogan. Although 
I was prepared to make some arguments, I think everybody 
is probably aware the insurance company is not a proper 
party to the case, so I would assume they have been 
dismissed out. Anyway. I represent Mr. Hogan and his 
interests, with the understanding we certainly argue in 
our briefs that we don't think it relates back to the 
original filing and, for what it is worth, I don't know 
that I would have much standing in that sense to say 
anything because I don't represent Ms. Peterson or 
whoever it will be that will be the named defendant and 
so--
THE COURT: So your argument is that it 
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wouldn't relate back, not that it wasn't barred in the 
first place from the statute of limitations. 
MR. CASPER: That's right. 
THE COURT: That was argued in the first 
answer. 
MR. CASPER: Right don't believe that it 
would relate back and I guess we are kind of getting 
into the argument now which based upon the 
Penrose versus Ross case, that there's no-- this isn't a 
case of it being a misnomer nor is it a case of being a 
unity of interest. And for the sake of judicial economy 
and waste of time, I just don't think iI: would relate 
back because assuming the Court granted the right to 
amend I think whoever came in to defend Ms. Peterson or 
hoever would be the new defendant, the properly named 
defendant would more certainly argue that it didn't 
relate back to the original filing and so as it pertains 
to Ms. Peterson, a finding of the complaint would be 
obviously well past the expiration of the statute of 
tations. 
THE COURT: Well, it sounds like then everyone 
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THE COURT: Then let's go ahead and do it. I 
thought: There's no reason to do that if in fact 
whether it relates back there's nothing timely for it to 
relate back to, but at least under this theory or under 
the theory that the savings statute would do it, a 
complaint on this issue was filed within four years of 
the accident on July 18th, 1996, everyone is willing to 
agree that I can at least begin listening to these 
hearings with that understanding? 
MR. CASPER: I agree with that. 
THE COURT: All right. Then if you want to 
continue
 f Mr. Casper. 
MR. CASPER: Okay. Judge, I'll just briefly 
set that record. The accident in question here-- Let me 
back up. The real issue as far as my client, Kendall 
Hogan is concerned, is that he is not the tortfeasor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CASPER: And I don't think there's any 
factual dispute as to that. The affidavit that he filed 
in support of the motion for summary judgment was indeed 
the fact that on July 18th, 1996, while he was a part 
owner of the vehicle, he was not driving the vehicle 
when it was involved in the accident with the plaintiff. 
And so as far as that issue goes, I think there's-- it's 
uncontroverted that he wasn't driving. And so on that 
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1 basis Mr. Hogan should be dismissed out. 
2 Dealing with the issues of the relation 
3 back of the proposed amended complaint by the plaintiff, 
4 the accident occurred on July 18th, 1996, and within a 
5 few days of the expiration of the four-year statute of 
6 limitations on July 14, 2000, a cause of action was 
7 filed naming Mr. Hogan, my client, as the defendant. 
8 That cause of action was subsequently dismissed out for 
9 failure to prosecute on March 12th, 2002. Again, the 
10 Case Number on that is Case No. 000206066. The present 
11 cause of action was then filed on March 10th, 2003, 
12 which, again would have been two days within the one 
13 year savings statute of Utah Code Section 78-12-40. So 
14 in our minds based upon that information we are within 
15 the one year statute of limitations from the savings 
16 statute of 78-12-40. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. CASPER: My understanding was from the 
19 information that Ifve been able to gather, is that the 
20 service of the complaint summons was completed on 
21 September 3, 2003, which, obviously, would not be within 
22 120 days, although I think at this point that's sort of 
23 a minimal argument that we are concerned with. Insofar 
24 as it goes to the relation back, I think we both, Mr. 
25 Cundick and I both believe that the controlling case 
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1 would be Penrose v. Ross, 71P 3d 631 The general facts 
2 of that accident are strikingly similar to what we have 
3 here, Judge. The accident occurred on November 21, 
4 1996. Four days before the expiration of the Statute of 
5 Limitations a complaint is filed naming the father of 
6 the tortfeasor as the defendant. Some time before a 
7 responsive pleading was due, the plaintiff amended the 
8 complaint but that was after the four-year statute of 
9 limitations had expired. And so-- and the amended 
10 complaint actually named the tortfeasor's son as the 
11 proper defendant. In dealing with the issue of the 
12 relation back under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
13 Procedure, the Utah Court of Appeals in Penrose 
14 addressed two issues where the relation back would take 
15 place. One is if the case is one of what they call a 
16 misnomer case and those issues deal with if in the 
17 statute, excuse me, that if in the caption or in the 
18 body of the complaint the proper party is named but 
19 because of typographical errors, or whatever the case 
2 0 may be, there is a misunderstanding at least of who the 
21 proper party is, then that would be a misnomer case and 
22 indeed the cause of action or--
23 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, I hate to 
24 interrupt, but just to save counsel, we agree that this 
25 is not a--
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MR. CASPER: Oh, yes. 
MR. CUNDICK: --misnomer case. 
THE COURT: This is not a misnomer. 
MR. CASPER: And I didn!t think that there 
would be much of an argument but Ifm just kind of going 
over what the Court--
THE COURT: And I appreciate at least the 
record being clear and this gives me an idea but thank 
you with that agreement. 
MR. CASPER: The other area is whether or not 
there1s a unity of interest between the two parties, the 
improperly named party and then, of course, the properly 
named party. In that case we're talking about a father 
and son who actually lived in the same house and the 
father was actually served with the complaint and, 
obviously, the argument, which I probably would have 
made myself if I was on that case, Judge, is the fact 
that youfve got a father and son living in a house 
together. The father gets sued. Well, certainly they 
talked about it and most certainly the son would have 
known about the cause of action. Notwithstanding that, 
the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a unity of 
interest by citing a case called Nunez v. Albo, which is 
53P 3d 2. In that case a physician was served for 
malpractice~but the proper party that should have been 
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1 named was the hospital and because the physician and the 
2 hospital enjoyed an employer/employee relationship, 
3 their interest would be the same in fact because of the 
4 doctrine of respondeat superior which essentially is: 
5 Well, if they1re going to go and get a judgment against 
6 the doctor for his responsibilities as a physician as an 
7 employee of the hospital, that in turn would be the same 
8 defenses, the same determination that would have been if 
9 the hospital had been named the proper party. And so 
10 they've got an employer/employee relationship where they 
11 have a unity of interest and the Court of Appeals in 
12 Nunez said there's a unity of interest and so it would 
13 relate back. However, in Penrose with the unity of 
14 interest being a father and son living in the same home, 
15 and wrongly named the father as the tortfeasor and then 
16 trying to amend after the statute of limitations had 
17 expired, they said there is no unity of interest. The 
18 defenses wouldn't be the same for the father, his 
19 defense, much like Mr. Hogan's defense in this case is: 
20 I wasn't the driver, I wasn't the tortfeasor here. And 
21 so in that sense there was no unity of interest. I think 
22 that's the more controlling case here. And so based upon 
23 that I don't think that there would-- we've agreed this 
24 is not a misnomer case and our argument, obviously, as 
25 far as unity of interest goes is that there is not a 
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1 unity of interest between Mr. Hogan, my client, and the 
2 person named on the police report as the driver, a Ms. 
3 Teresa Peterson. There is no allegations in the 
4 complaint that said Mr. Hogan was negligent in his 
5 entrustment of the vehicle to Ms. Peterson, it's a 
6 straight negligence, Mr. Hogan was negligent in the 
7 operation of the motor vehicle which caused injury to 
8 the plaintiff in this case. That being said, I don't 
9 think there is a unity of interest here sufficient to 
10 relate the filing of any amended complaint back to the 
11 March 10th, 2003 date, which would have been two days 
12 within the Statute of Limitations. As such a filing 
13 would obviously occur after both the four-year statute 
14 of limitations of 78-12-25 as well as the one-year 
15 savings statute of 78-12-40 and thus would be barred by 
16 the Statute of Limitations. Thank you, Judge. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Cundick. 
18 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, there is absolutely 
19 no dispute as to the facts and what has been stated by 
20 counsel is accurate as far as the facts of Kendall 
21 Peterson and-- or Kendall Hogan and Teresa Peterson. 
22 The only difference between this case and the Penrose 
23 case is that Mr. Drake named State Farm, who does have a 
24 unity of interest with Teresa Peterson, inasmuch as the 
25 defenses arguably to State Farm would be the defenses 
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1 available to Ms. Peterson. And that's similar, that's 
2 kind of similar to the Nunez v. Albo; that is, that in 
3 the end the physician and then you have the employer, 
4 that is if the physician is found to be liable then that 
5 brings in the liability of the hospital; whereas you 
6 have the same situation here; that is, if Ms. Peterson 
7 is found to be liable it brings in the liability of 
8 State Farm.. So we think that this is more akin to the 
9 Nunez v. Albo case versus the Penrose case. But the 
10 Penrose case does a nice job going through the entire 
11 law that has been accurately stated by counsel and that 
12 is that this is not a misnomer, it's a unity of interest 
13 case, and so we have to determine whether there is unity 
14 of interest. Clearly there is not unity of interest 
15 between Kendall Hogan and Teresa Peterson but because 
16 Mr. Drake named State Farm that puts State Farm on 
17 notice and put the unity of interest between State Farm 
18 and Teresa Peterson. If you look at the Penrose case, 
19 if I can find the appropriate language, in paragraph 5 
20 it says, the last quote, and it's quoting Vina v. 
21 Jefferson Insurance, "When the new and old parties have 
22 an identity of interest so it can be assumed or proved 
23 that the relation back is not prejudicial." And we're 
24 arguing that that is the fact of this case, and that is 
25 that because State Farm was named, State Farm was named 
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1 within the proper time period they cannot claim that 
2 they're prejudiced by the amendment of the pleading 
3 because they are on notice of the-- their insured being 
4 Teresa Peterson. In fact, it's ironic but State Farm is 
5 also the carrier for the plaintiff also, which brings 
6 another reason why they were on notice and why it would 
7 not be prejudicial. So, in summary then, it is not a 
8 misnomer, it is a unity of interest. And if you look at 
9 the purpose of the unity of interest, it's to insure 
10 that there is no prejudice. There is no prejudice in 
11 this case and we have unity of interest between State 
12 Farm and Teresa Peterson. Admittedly, there is no 
13 identity or unity of interest between Kendall Hogan and 
14 Teresa Peterson; consequently, we would request that the 
15 amendment be made and it relate back. 
16 Now, Your Honor, counsel has raised one final 
17 issue that I would like to address and that is that he 
18 has indicated that because Kendall Hogan should simply 
19 just be dismissed. And that may be what the Court 
2 0 ultimately needs to do, however, in the event that the 
21 Court denies this motion, I would like to at least give 
22 Mr. Drake the opportunity to argue that particular issue 
23 of liability of Mr. Hogan if there was some relationship 
24 that would give rise to liability between Mr. Hogan and 
25 Teresa Peterson. Apparently there was some relationship 
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1 as far as she was a girlfriend of his son or something 
2 like that, and she may have been given permission to be 
3 driving it or there may be something. We don't have any 
4 of those facts and I didn't submit an affidavit because 
5 I don't have any information that would give that, you 
6 know, support that type of theory. It is not a theory 
7 that I am desirous of pursuing but in fairness to Mr. 
8 Drake and his position, if the Court denies my motion, 
9 then I think he he has an interest to defend on that 
10 point, if that makes sense. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. And I will let Mr. Casper 
12 respond to that as well. 
13 MR. CUNDICK: Thank you very much. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Casper. 
15 MR. CASPER: Thanks, Judge. First and 
16 foremost, the allegations of the complaint is what 
17 interests my client most and there are no allegations 
18 that then there was any negligent entrustment. Again, 
19 we're talking simply about a straight negligence case 
20 alleging that Mr. Hogan was the driver of the vehicle 
21 and indeed he wasn't the driver of the vehicle. 
22 In regards to the unity of interest through 
23 State Farm, I would point the Court to the case of 
24 Campbell versus Stagg, 596P 2d 1037. Which I have a copy 
25 if the Court wishes to see it, if I may I approach. 
Page 1 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. CASPER: That case and every other case in 
the State of Utah that has dealt with that issue indeed 
states on page 2, if I may point out to the Court. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CASPER: At the very bottom, it says: 
"Issued in Utah. Plaintiff must direct his action 
against the actual tortfeasor, not the insurer." I think 
it is pretty clear that even though State Farm may be 
the indemnitor of anyone involved in the accident, the 
fact remains that they are not the proper party to--
they have a contractual obligation once a determination 
is made that their insured is liable. They don't have a 
unity of interest, they don't have a connection in 
everyone such that they can get sued and then their 
insureds are indeed on the hook or liable for any 
damages that are caused. Thank you. 
MR. CONDICK: Your Honor, can I just briefly 
reply? I know thatfs out of order but this is--
THE COURT: I want everything discussed so 
that when a ruling finally comes down nobody claims that 
I didnft hear it all and itfs important that I hear it 
all and you can respond after, of course. 
MR. CUNDICK: Thank you. If this would have 
been Aiona versus State Farm and we, you know, had sued 
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1 them, then we would be in here saying: Judge, let us 
2 substitute Teresa Peterson for State Farm because we 
3 shouldn't have named State Farm, as per his case that he 
4 submitted, his Campbell case he has submitted. At that 
5 point it would be the exact same argument and that is: 
6 Okay. You want to replace Teresa Peterson with State 
7 Farm. Well, we'll allow you to do that and it will 
8 relate back if there's a unity of interest between State 
9 Farm and Teresa Peterson. So even though counsel is 
10 correct in his law, I think it's just another way of 
11 stating the same issue: Is there a unity of interest 
12 between State Farm and Teresa Peterson? 
13 MR. CASPER: I'm not going to be guilty of--
14 (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: All right. I think that I now 
16 have the outline here, that it's a little bit clearer 
17 and I appreciate everyone working with me in a flexible 
18 way so that we really knew what issue we were dealing 
19 with. And I think that the issue is clear that it is 
2 0 whether or not there ought to be an amendment allowed at 
21 this time and it would need to be based on the relation 
22 back and, more specifically on the unity of interest. 
23 I do find that there is not a unity of 
24 interest, certainly none between Kendall Hogan and Ms. 
25 Peterson. And the question of whether we can stretch 
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1 that enough, that there is a unity of interest between 
2 State Farm and Ms. Peterson, and that there really isn't 
3 any prejudice because State Farm was somehow put on 
4 notice that this suit was being pursued and, therefore, 
5 it would go to Ms. Peterson, I think is just pushing it 
6 too far past the point of where there really is a 
7 prejudice. First of all, State Farm is listed in this 
8 one, while it is argued that it was coincidentally the 
9 same insurer of Kendall Hogan, he was listed as the 
10 insurer, as Kendall Hogan, I assume, and so it is a 
11 coincidence that it is the same insurer under, who it 
12 would be with Ms. Peterson, and there is too much 
13 potential for prejudice there, that there is no reason 
14 to assume that that puts them on notice that they're 
15 going to sue anyone who might be related in that 
16 situation. There is just not a sufficient unity, a 
17 sufficient unity of interest there. I think it's clear 
18 that Mr. Hogan is not the correct tortfeasor and the 
19 arguments to try and stretch this to get to the correct 
20 tortfeasor just simply are not-- do not have enough 
21 connections to allow the relation, relating back statute 
22 to come into place. That's not what it's intended to do. 
23 And I find that there is not sufficient unity of 
24 interest there as to, I guess, the named defendants here 
25 and Ms. Peterson in order to allow that relation back. 
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1 So I am-- and at this point let's make clear what 
2 motions, therefore, are actually being addressed. The 
3 motion originally is that Mr. Hogan be dismissed out of 
4 this case because he is not the tortfeasor and a summary 
5 judgment on that. And that certainly is the effect of 
6 this ruling but it also addresses the responses in the 
7 plaintiff's motion to amend or change the name of the 
8 defendant and that is being denied by virtue of this 
9 ruling. Is that clear enough? It is kind of a 
10 roundabout way of getting back to it but I want to rule 
11 on the actual motions that are before me and that's how 
12 I understand them. 
13 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, as far as the 
14 procedure went, I understand the Court's ruling. The 
15 response to the motion for summary judgment and the 
16 request to allow Mr. Drake to pursue the issue of 
17 whether there is any type of, you know, liability that 
18 would be derived through the relationship with Mr. Hogan 
19 and Ms. Peterson. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. CUNDICK: Is he given leave to do that? 
22 THE COURT: Do you wish any further response 
23 to that other than your-- well--
24 MR. CASPER: I will just say pursuant to the 
25 Rules of Civil Procedure he most certainly could file a 
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60(b) motion of some sort and say there's facts that 
weren't considered by the Court and which could 
otherwise-- which I would object to that opportunity. 
I think Mr. Cundick has done a fabulous job of trying 
to-- I don't want to get myself in trouble with other 
members of the Bar, but to try and save the case and I 
just don't think it's warranted. 
THE COURT: Anything further on that, Mr. 
Cundick? 
MR. CUNDICK; No. 
THE COURT: You have done, made the record 
very clear. There have been no allegations made 
originally of negligent entrustment. You know, if Mr. 
Drake wants to review the law and see that there is some 
way he can appropriately file it, but I am not going to 
allow this to be a boot-strapping point. Clearly, the 
wrong parties have been in the suit have been named. The 
suit named the wrong parties here. I have made the 
ruling that Mr. Hogan is not the tortfeasor, he is 
dismissed out of the case and I do not find that it is 
saved and allow for the amended information to include 
Ms. Peterson. Now that is on the relation back theory. 
And if there is anything further that they can do, then 
they will need to do that and start again anew. But I do 
think that there has been a genuine effort to protect 
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1 I the case at every means and I am just not willing to 
2 stretch it that far. 
3 MR. CUNDICK: Thank you. 
4 MR. CASPER: Judge, do you wish that I 
5 prepare an order? 
6 THE COURT: I would ask that you prepare that 
7 order and I appreciate everyone's approach to this so 
8 that I could get the understanding here of what we're 
9 dealing with. Thank you. 
10 MR. CASPER: Thank you. 
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